Ontario Bar Association
I spoke at the Ontario Bar Association's annual meeting yesterday. It's interesting to hear the Canadian point of view concerning insurance coverage.
I spoke at the Ontario Bar Association's annual meeting yesterday. It's interesting to hear the Canadian point of view concerning insurance coverage.
The Madoff Mess will eventually raise interesting insurance issues; not so much with Madoff as with the middlemen. The entities that fed clients to Madoff will surely be sued. Their due diligence will be questioned. But, will the middlemen's problems be considered insured?
If you have any doubt that the financial crisis will lead to D&O claims from banks and other similar entities, read Gretchen Morgenson's article in yesterday's (11/2/08) New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/02/business/02gret.html?scp=1&sq=morgenson%20loan%20didnt%20like&st=cse
Very interesting!
If you predicted that Bear Stearns officers and directors would be sued within “days” of the announced sale to J.P. Morgan you wildly underestimated this conflict. A suit was filed on March 17, 2008, the same day that the J.P. Morgan deal was announced. See Eastside Holdings Inc. v. Bear Stearns Cos., SDNY. Plaintiffs allege that “defendants disseminated or approved … false statements… which they knew … were misleading in that they contained misrepresentations and failed to disclose material facts…. Defendants … employed devices, schemes and artifices to defraud …[and] engaged in acts, practices and a course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit…. See paras. 61-62. You can surely expect the defendants to make D&O claims, and insurers will need to consider their fraud exclusions.
Policyholders often seek discovery of carriers’ representations to reinsurers. The thinking is that if the carrier took a certain position with its reinsurers it must also take that position with its policyholders. Not so, says the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. Irving Materials, Inc. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18692 (D. Ind. Mar. 10, 2008). There, the policyholder challenged a multiple-occurrence ruling on the grounds that the carrier had made a single-occurrence argument to its reinsurer. The court, however, ruled that the representations to the reinsurer were not material.
Identifying the next emerging issue is often difficult, but recent actuarial reports indicate that the subprime mortgage crisis will surely develop into an insurance coverage issue.
In January of 2008, Bear Sterns estimated that D&O insurers may face $9 billion in claims-related costs. To avoid the hype that often surrounds new insurance issues —remember the doomsday forecasts concerning Y2K— compare the subprime projection to other recent insurance issues. The $9 billion for subprime suits roughly matches the World Trade Center reconstruction cost. Insurers’ payments following Katrina and Rita were about $28 billion. On asbestos liability, it is estimated that insurers will ultimately suffer a total liability of $65 billion. The subprime crisis, therefore, appears to be significantly smaller than long-term insurance problems , but the subprime crisis is comparable to other recent discrete catastrophes, and certainly the subprime crisis is large enough to consider the coverage issues.
To identify these coverage issues, it is useful to note the types of suits being filed. Thus far, we have seen: borrower lawsuits against lenders (allegedly, loan did not fit needs or loan officer received the financial rewards for steering them towards loans with higher rates, and hidden fees and costs); borrower lawsuits against investment banks for providing financial backing to aggressive lenders despite questionable business practices; lender lawsuits against banks; shareholder suits against lenders; individual investor lawsuits; and regulators’ suits against lenders.
The common thread is that the suits generally allege some form of dishonest conduct, and this allegation creates the likely key coverage issue: fraud.
D&O policies generally exclude coverage for acts that are fraudulent. Although the policies are consistent in the concept of excluding fraud, the policies vary in the language for excluding fraud.
A common exclusion bars coverage “for any deliberately fraudulent act or omission or any willful violation of any statute or regulation if a judgment or other final adjudication adverse to such Insured Person establishes that such Insured Person committed such an act, omission, or willful violation….” (italics added) This exclusion requires more than fraud allegations. Fraud, in this form, must be “established” by a “judgment or other final adjudication.”
Other policies set the evidentiary bar lower, and coverage is barred for conduct that is fraudulent “in fact.” This language is friendlier to insurers. The “in fact” fraud exclusion does not require a final adjudication. But the application of the “in fact” exclusion is also more likely to be disputed; “final adjudication” is a brighter line than “in fact.” This is not to suggest, however, that the “final adjudication” provision will never be disputed; parties might dispute what is “final” or even what is “adjudicated.”
Dishonesty can raise coverage issues besides the fraud exclusion. For example, some policies include “personal profit” exclusions. Coverage is barred for claims “based upon, arising out of, or attributable to such Insured Person gaining in fact any personal profit … to which such Insured Person was not legally entitled.” (Italics added.) Some subprime suits will surely involve claims that the officers and directors made profits to which they were not entitled. This provision has been implicated in other recent corporate governance scandals (e.g., the personal profit exclusion was applied to Dennis Kozlowski’s claims concerning his compensation from Tyco).
Ultimately, based on the reports now being received the subprime mortgage crisis will be a significant insurance issue, with significant coverage issues.
Managing the risk of hurricanes and other natural disasters is a very difficult problem, but New York State’s proposed special hurricane fund appears to be the wrong solution. The proposal being considered would force insurers to set aside a portion of their premiums for hurricanes, but insurers would not be able to deduct this expense until it is actually spent on a hurricane. This proposal is discussed in Joe Treaster’s article in this morning’s New York Times. Special Fund Proposed for Hurricane Insurance, 10/9/07, at C4. Insurers would be setting aside money now, paying taxes now, and receiving deductions later. Rather than solving the hurricane burden, this proposal seems to exacerbate that burden. This program would quickly become another illustration of how New York is a tough place to do business.
It will be interesting to see whether Governor Spitzer signs the legislation that would require insurers to demonstrate prejudice as part of a late notice defense. I hope that the governor declines to sign this bill. The New York no-prejudice position is a minority view, but it is a thoroughly considered view. Insurers should be free to set conditions on their coverage, and prompt notice of claims is a very reasonable condition.
I was interested to read a comment on absolute pollution exclusions on the Anderson Kill website: "in the context of negligent workplace exposure claims alleging bodily injury from exposure to a product in the stream of commerce, the [absolute] pollution exclusion should not apply." What does the "stream of commerce" have to do with an absolute exclusion? And really, the suggested exception to the exclusion raises broader questions. Don't insurers have the right to decline to issue insurance for certain risks? Barring some statutory obligation, shouldn't insurers be permitted to issue an absolute exclusion for anything at all? If an insurer issues a policy that does not apply to certain risks and the insurer does not collect a premium for these excluded risks, should the insurer be forced to pay for these risks? The attacks on the absolute pollution exclusion-- efforts to infer exceptions that do no not appear in the policy language-- are just wrong.