Alabama Enforces "Ambiguous" Pollution Exclusion

I just read an interesting pollution exclusion decision from the Supreme Court of Alabama. State Auto Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality, 370 Ark. 251; 258 S.W.3d 736; 2007 Ark. Lexis 378 (Ark. 2007). While the court declined to overrule past decisions finding the definition of "pollutant" ambiguous in the context of pollution exclusions, the court accepted extrinsic evidence to cure the ambiguity and hold that gasoline is a "pollutant." I note this case because it is so unusual to see a court maintaining the view that a provision is ambiguous, yet curing the ambiguity and finding for the insurer.  Undoubtedly, the court was reluctant to overrule its earlier decision, but the court was looking to move away from that decision.

Criminal and Civil Overlap May Bar Coverage in Subprimes

Interesting to see a criminal suit being brought against people named in subprime civil suits.  http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/20/business/20bear.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin
Dishonest conduct exclusions will surely be asserted in some of these subprime cases.

Pollution Exlcusion Applies to the Natural

My father the chemist taught me that "natural doesn't always mean good."  The Minnesota Court of Appeals took a similar view to hold that the pollution exclusion applied to composting, even though composting is natural.  It's an interesting decision.  Larson v. Composting Concepts, Inc., 2008 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 551 (May 13, 2008).

"Pollutant" Interpreted Broadly

Add the Montana Supreme Court to the list of courts recognizing that the term “pollutant” must be given a broad meaning. The court recognized that diesel fuel is a pollutant within the meaning of the pollution exclusion. Montana Petroleum Tank Release Compensation Board v. Crumleys, Inc., 2008 MT 2, 2008 Mont. LEXIS 4 (Jan. 3, 2008).

Useful Property Does Not Mean It's Not a Pollutant

I just came across an interesting recent decision from the Supreme Court of Alabama, Federated Mutual Ins. Co. v. Abston Petroleum, Inc., 2007 Ala. LEXIS 65. The case addresses a policyholder's effort to challenge a pollution exclusion where the released substance, though noxious, is useful. The Alabama Supreme Court rejected the policyholder argument: “We conclude that the better-reasoned approach is that applied by the majority of courts that have reviewed a pollution-exclusion clause identical to or markedly similar to the clause in the Federated Mutual policy before us. We hold that gasoline, although not a pollutant when properly used for the purposes for which it is intended, is clearly a pollutant when it leaks into the soil from underground lines or tanks or when fumes from such a leak are so dangerous that a business must be closed, as was the case here. The simple fact that gasoline serves a vital purpose when released from a properly constructed tank into the confines of an internal combustion engine does not permit us to blink reality and overlook the deleterious consequences that occur when gasoline is introduced into the soil or when its fumes escape into the atmosphere. Because we conclude that gasoline is clearly a pollutant as that term [*23] is used in the policy, any argument that the pollution-exclusion clause is ambiguous cannot be supported. Because we hold that the clause is unambiguous, we need not consider the arguments made by Abston Petroleum and the Schills that we should consider the drafting and regulatory history of such clauses or that the policy must be construed against the insurer, who drafted it.” (Emphasis added.)

Absolute Pollution Exclusions: What Part of "Absolute" Confuses You

I was interested to read a comment on absolute pollution exclusions on the Anderson Kill website: "in the context of negligent workplace exposure claims alleging bodily injury from exposure to a product in the stream of commerce, the [absolute] pollution exclusion should not apply."  What does the "stream of commerce" have to do with an absolute exclusion? And really, the suggested exception to the exclusion raises broader questions. Don't insurers have the right to decline to issue insurance for certain risks?  Barring some statutory obligation, shouldn't insurers be permitted to issue an absolute exclusion for anything at all?  If an insurer issues a policy that does not apply to certain risks and the insurer does not collect a premium for these excluded risks, should the insurer be forced to pay for these risks?  The attacks on the absolute pollution exclusion-- efforts to infer exceptions that do no not appear in the policy language-- are just wrong.